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1. THE NOVELTY OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Emerging technologies offer an excellent perspective from which to
analyze the shift from government to governance, that frequently occurs
today'. This perspective is particularly obvious with nanotechnologies and
various new developments in biotechnologies, such as the so-called syn-
thetic biology. I shall focus here on the case of nanotechnologies.
Nanotechnologies affect many legal domains, including environmen-
tal protection, consumer protection, medical law, occupational health and
safety, privacy and civil liberties, intellectual property rights, and patent
1. OST F. (2008), Dalla Pirámide alla rete: un nuovo pradigma per la scienza giuridica?, in
M. Vogliotti (a cura di), // tramonto delta modernità giuridica. Un percorso interdisciplinare,
Giappichelli, Torino, pp. 29-48, p. 42.
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law. Nevertheless, analysis of the legal implications of nanotechnologies
is just beginning^
The European Commission and European advisory bodies (e.g., the
European Group on Ethics of Technology) have suggested that existing
laws designed for other purposes should be applied to nanotechnologies^
This, however, has mainly proven to be an untenable approach. It is widely
recognized that nanotechnology outcomes are not properly addressed by
existing laws. First of all, the scale, novel properties, and hybrid composi-
tion of nanoproducts may make them unsuitably covered by existing leg-
islation. Second, nanotechnologies produce effects that are not classifiable
in discrete categories such as the mechanical, chemical, or biological ones.
For example, nanomedical products cannot be placed into one of the tradi-
tional classifications of drugs, devices, or biological products". In addition,
nanotechnologies are characterized as "enabling technologies", since they
can pervade any other technological domain, a further reason why they
tend to cross and blur the classifications made by existent law.
However, the problems faced in applying existing law to evaluate prod-
ucts and processes involving nanotechnology can hardly be solved by sim-
ply enacting new laws, unless some conceptual issues are confronted first.
The core issue concerns the risks associated with ingestion, inhalation, and
absorption of nanoparticles by the human body and with the dispersion of
nanoparticles in the environment. These risks are hard to qualify and quan-
tify as is foreseeing the probabilities of their occurrence.
Let us consider some examples. Chemical substances seem to change
their behavior at the nanoscale, invalidating the intended monitoring effect
of the distinction between existing substances (which appears in the Euro-
pean Inventory of Existing Commercial Substances) and new substances.
REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Approval of Chemicals) is the only EC
legislative initiative (Regulation CE n. 1907/2006) intended to solve this
2. BROWNSWORD R. (2008), Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution, Oxford
Utiiversity Press, Oxford; VAN CALSTER G. (2008), "Risk Regulation, EU Law and Emerging
Technologies: Smother or Smooth?", Nanoethics, 2, n. 1.
3. It should be noted that the European Parliament came to the opposite conclusion, maintain-
ing that a new, ad hoc regulation is needed for nanotechnologies.
4. For issues concerning nanomedicine, see GUERRA G. (2008), "European Regulatory Issues
In Nanomedicine", Nanoethics, 2, 1; Dorbeck-Jung (2009). For a wider perspective and with
reference to additional EU countries' legislation, see BOWMAN, D.M. (2008), "Governing Nano-
technologies: Weaving New Regulatory Webs or Patching Up the Old?", Nanoethics, 2,179-181 ;
LUDLOW, K. (2008), "Nanoregulation. Filtering Out the Small Stuff', Nanoethics, 2, 183-191.
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problem'. But establishing the criteria for distinguishing existing substanc-
es from new ones in the case of nanomaterials involves making some theo-
retical choices. For example, the molecular identity of a listed substance
may be an insufficient criterion to identify a substance at a nanoscale as an
existing chemical substance, since scale seems to make a difference in the
physical, chemical, and biological properties of a material^ Determining
the distinct qualities of nanoparticles, therefore, requires the use of com-
plex criteria, based -for instance- on size and an emergent (significant)
property, or on size and the significant new use.' In another example, new
drug delivery systems provided by nanobiotechnological applications are
difficult to fit into the taxonomy of medical devices established by Com-
munitarian law (Directive 93/42/EEC).
With regard to the second issue, we can see that just one of the main
advantages made possible by nanotechnologies, i.e. specific therapeutic
targeting, could be one of the causes of uncertainty in foreseeing and as-
sessing risks. That uncertainty makes it difficult to provide adequate infor-
mation for obtaining consent for therapy or performing a clinical trial. It
may also affect the individuation of the trade-off between risks and ben-
efits. The highly targeted drug effects promised by nanomedicine might
undermine the relatively steady effects required when applying statistical
criteria to enroll human subjects for trials as well as foreseeing the out-
come.
To sum up, it may be that the very role played by clinical trials should,
in a sense, be reconsidered. Criteria for determining the causality nexus
in law are traditionally based on ascertained probabilities, which are not
assured in nanomedicine. This issue is highly important when profession-
al negligence, medical malpractice liability, and harm assessment are at
stake. Early diagnosis may increase a patient's responsibility, but it may
also enlarge the physician's responsibility and liability as well as widen the
gap between diagnostic capacity and therapeutic capacity. In the domain of
a therapeutic relationship, responsibility might tend to shift from physician
to patient, because of the possibility of earlier detection of diseases and the
availability of the so-called lab-on-chip. The very borders between health
5. BOWMAN, D.M. (2008), op. cit.; VAN CALSTER G . (2008), op. cit..
6. See PRESTON, C.J., SHENIM, M.Y., SPROAT, S.J., SWARUP, V.P. (2010), "The Novelty of
Nano and the Regulatory Challenge of Newness", Nanoethics, 4, pp. 13-26.
7. Ibidem.
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and illness might start to vanish, especially if we also consider the promise
of enhancement of human performance.
Both those who think that emerging technologies such as nanotechnolo-
gies should be regulated as much as possible by existing norms that have
been created for other purposes and those who maintain the need for a spe-
cific regulation must defend their positions by establishing whether (i) there
is anything truly new in nanotechnologies affecting legal regulation; (ii) the
existing normative framework can be regarded as comprehensive, unambig-
uous, consistent, and acceptable; and (iii) if it can be complied withl
To rely solely on the existing normative framework might be awkward,
since it might be possible for a nanotechnology process or product to be
affected by several normative disciplines. This would cause uncertainty or
incoherence in applying existing norms. Moreover, sticking to existing law
might amplify the drawbacks stemming from differences among domestic
regulations and encourage the "lex shopping phenomenon" for firms, users
and consumers.
The construction of a regulatory framework for emerging technologies,
however, requires two preliminary steps, respectively dealing with clari-
fying background principles and embracing a specific risk management
model. In order to design a regulatory approach to nanotechnologies, it
should first be asked if, from the legal point of view, the notion of risk dif-
fers from the notion of uncertainty. It seems as if it does differ, which is
why the precautionary principle, though questionable in its meaning and
implications, has to be applied. Regulators need to know whether nano-
products are potentially harmful, but they have to regulate even when risks
and harm are not quantifiable.
2. THE AMBIGUOUS USE OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE BETWEEN
RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
Uncertainty in assessing the consequences for the environment, health
and safety that may be associated with a given process or product rep-
resents the main reason for the appeal to the precautionary principle in
8. GRUNWALD, A. (2005), "Nanotechnology. A New Field of Ethical Inquiry", Science and
Engineering Ethics, 11, p. 189; VAN DE POEL, I. (2008), "How Should We Do Nanoethics?
A Network Approach for Discerning ethical Issues in Nanotechnology", Nanoethics, 2, pp.
32-33.
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the search for a regulatory framework applicable to emerging technologies
such as nanotechnologies'.
The precautionary principle was recognized for the first time within the
World Charter for Nature in 1982, restated in 1992 within the Rio Declara-
tion, and then within the Convention on Biodiversity, and the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety (2000), It has therefore taken the status of a principle
of international law and it is applied to a variety of topics, such as sustain-
able development and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement
(1994) passed by the World Trade Organization, It has also taken on the
status of general principle within the EU legal order as well, with regard to
environmental and health protection issues.
The precautionary principle has been defined and interpreted in several
ways, mainly in terms of a weaker and a stronger meaning. The weaker
meaning maintains that the absence of evidence of the harm that may be
associated with the use of a substance or with an activity should not be a
reason to avoid regulating the matter. The stronger meaning requires pre-
emptive measures to be taken if a substance or an activity appears to be
damaging to human health or the environment, even if the causal nexus has
not been fully shown.
Common to all the defmitions of the principle is the inversion of the bur-
den of proof, which depends on those who propose the actions at issue'".
In recent years, a wide-ranging debate has underscored the shortcom-
ings of the precautionary principle, which has been regarded as ambigu-
ous, unsuitable for the orientation of genuine regulatory options, capable
of increasing people's anxiety, and too intertwined with a biased social
perception of risk".
9. This point of view has been explored by the European Commission Communication on
the precaution principle (2000) and in the Italian National Bioethics Committee opinion on Na-
nosciences and Nanotechnologies (2006).
10. In the EU legal order, according to the clarification of the EU Commission Communica-
tion on the Precautionary Principle, the inversion of the burden of proof does not apply in general
but just to those activities and products that require approval before being put on the market. In
all the other cases it is up to users and addresses (citizens, consumers' associations, or the govern-
ment) to show the kind and degree of the harm and the level of risk that can be associated with
them. Sec on this, FEINTUCK, M . (2005), "Precautionary Maybe, but What's the Principle? The
Precautionary Principle, the Regulation of Risk, and the Public Domain", Journal of Law and
Society, 32, 3, p. 386.
11. SuNSTEiN, CR. (2005), Laws of Fear. Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge (Mass.); MARCHANT, G . E . et. al. (2008), "Risk Management Prin-
ciples for Nanotechnology", Nanoethics, 2, 1 ; HULL, G . (2007), Normative Aspects of a "Sub-
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It has often been pointed out that the precautionary principle is geared
towards the status quo and fails to highlight the opportunity costs. As such,
the precautionary type of logic could lead regulators to focus on some
events and difficulties related to certain activities, but would not allow
consideration of all the options; as a result, regulative decisions would tend
to be based on the most negative predictions, rather than on a balanced
consideration of all possible consequences'^ In this sense, the precaution-
ary principle is regarded as fostering a tendency to consider the advantages
and risks of a given activity or product separately".
For these reasons, this principle is regarded by many scholars as unsuit-
able to shape policies measures and risk management strategies. According
to this perspective, rather than a genuine legal principle, capable of being
translated into policies and applied by judges, it can at most be seen as a
"mental state'"". It is, however, possible to fmd in such a precautionary
principle a tool suitable for the fostering of a constructive view of dialogue
among the sciences, society, politics, and law, which seems to be a very
fertile ground for shaping a regulatory approach to emerging technologies.
Some important suggestions in this direction can be found within the com-
munication drafted by the (European Union) Commission on the precau-
tionary principle. This paper aims to clarify the Commission's approach
to the principle, set down the guidelines for its implementation, and avoid
references to the precautionary view as a hidden form of protectionism in
international commerce within and outside the EU.
From the EU Commission's point of view, the precautionary principle
is to be thought of as a part of a structured approach to risk analysis, which
includes three dimensions: risk assessment, risk management, and risk
communication. This principle is regarded as particularly relevant for risk
management. Within this perspective it is emphasized that (i) the appeal to
the precautionary principle does not necessarily involve the introduction
of legally binding measures; (ii) the normative decisions stemming from
the application of the principle should meet proportionality and non-dis-
crimination and should be based on a cost-benefit analysis that is not solely
stantive" Precautionary Principle, in: Social Science and Research Network (SSRN) available
at: SSRN_ID2023357_code861170.pdf.
12. MAJONE, G. (2002), "What Price Safety? The Precautionary Principle and its Politcy Im-
plications", Journal of Common Market Studies, 40, 1, p. 103.
13. MARCHANT, SYLVESTER and ABBOTT (2008), op. cit..
14. MAJONE (2002), op. cit., pp. 93; 106.
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economic but that takes into consideration the opportunity costs as well;
and (iii) such decisions should be open to revisions and suitable for a hori-
zontal type of diffusion requiring the responsibility of producing scientific
evidence for a wider risk assessment. It is worth noting that the Commu-
nication construes and underscores the difference between a prudential ap-
proach and the application of the precautionary principle. Whereas the pru-
dential approach is part of risk assessment, application of the precautionary
principle is said to be part of the risk management process specifically
when scientific uncertainty does not allow a full understanding of the risk
itself. Thus, strictly speaking, the distance between a prudential approach
and the precautionary principle is based on the distance between risk and
uncertain harm". As it has also been pointed out by the Expert Group on
Science and Governance, "risk, uncertainty, ambiguity, ignorance, indeter-
minacy... [imply] quite a different strategic and methodological treatment,
extending well beyond conventional 'risk assessment'".
A problem, thus, emerges at this point: on the one hand, the precaution-
ary principle is, according to the Commission, relevant when it is not pos-
sible to quantify the risks that may be associated with a given substance,
activity, or technology yet on the other hand, the precautionary principle
is called upon to frame the risk management. The notion of uncertainty is
therefore replaced by the idea of risk", even though the latter notion has
widely been regarded as not useful in the contexts of emerging technolo-
gies'l Cost-benefit analysis looks at costs solely in economic terms," but
such costs are not always entirely of an economic nature and are not al-
ways comparable. Moreover, the legal policies measure must also protect
public interests and individual rights, even if they conflict with specific
interests and economic evaluations. Once again, the best available techno-
logical model seems to be inadequate in the case of nanotechnologies, due
to the lack of information on related risks and because it does not foster the
acquisition of new knowledge^".
15. On this distinction, see VAN CALSTER (2008), op. cit..
16. Expert Group on Science and Governance, 2007, p. 35.
17. On the importance of the distinction between risk and uncertainty: FEINTUCK (2005), op.
c;7.,p. 390.
18. FERRARI, A. (2010), "Developments in the Debate on Nanoethics: Traditional Approaches
and the Need for New Kinds of Analysis", Nanoethics, 4, p. 33.
19. ZlEGLER, A.S. (2006), "Threat to Converging Technologies", Annals of New York Acad-
emy of Sciences, p. 342.
20. MARCHANT et al. (2008), op. cit.
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This illustrates an inherent difficulty which is a characteristic of the
precautionary principle: it was conceived to approach contexts that cannot
be appropriately confronted through the model of acceptable risk, cost-
benefit analysis, or reference to the best available technology^'. It does not
contain in itself the criteria and the tools to automatically ñilfill this task. It
therefore seems likely that the risk assessment framework will continue to
be the dominant framework in this context".
The shift from uncertainty to risk can lead us to miss the specificity
of the precautionary principle. Such specificity is also reflected in some
features of the provisions inspired by the principle, such as the need for
flexibility, the temporary nature of the legal provisions and their openness
to new information.
Given the broad definition of the precautionary principle and the func-
tion which has been assigned to it, the regulatory relevance of the precau-
tionary principle seems to depend more on the clarification of the forms of
its implementation rather than on its definition.
3. SHIFTTNG TOWARDS A CONSTRUCTIVE MEANING OF THÉ PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE: CONSEQUENCES FOR A GENERAL VIEW OF REGULATION
A reasonable interpretation of the precautionary principle, as confirmed
by the EU Commission Communication, demands on an understanding of
the principle to be considered in risk (rectius: uncertainty) analysis that in-
cludes risk assessment and risk management". Such a perspective has the
advantage of integrating analysis and management of risk, with important
consequences for the conceptualization of the relationships among social
assessment, regulation, and scientific analysis. This view involves the idea
that defining risk requires both implicit and explicit ethical, social, and
political choices and that applying the precautionary principle requires a
preliminary prioritization of the values at stake^l It is thus extremely im-
21. Ibidem.
22. Also see on this FERRARI (2010), op. cit., p. 33.
23. DE SADELEER, N . (2006), "The Precautionary Principle in EC Health and Environmental
Law", European Law Journal, 12, 2, p. 146; FEINTUCK (2005), op. cit., p. 384.
24. SAGOFF, M . (2004), Price, Principle, and Environment, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, p. 28.
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portant to determine how the process of defining an acceptable level of risk
can become a democratic one.
It follows that a sound understanding of the precautionary principle
should not encourage regulators to embrace the strong meaning of the
principle to such an extent that such a meaning turns out to be an inhibi-
tory one. To adopt the precautionary principle should not be understood
as the definitive word for the problem of uncertainty; rather, it should
serve as the starting point for the construction of a system of assess-
ment and management of uncertainty. This is the main reason to opt for a
regulatory approach that integrates reactive, proactive, and anticipatory
measures.
Regulation should foster a constant acquisition of information about the
processes or the products at stake, with two main purposes: the reduction
of uncertainty in risk assessment and the gradual construction of the notion
of acceptable risk. In addition, public regulation should promote the cre-
ation of arenas in which the refiexive understanding of the consequences
of technologies and their acceptability is possible.
In the case of nanotechnologies, at least as they are relevant to the do-
mains that have been regarded as particularly worthy of being pursued
and developed by the EU approach, regulation should fulfill three basic
purposes: (i) promoting specific policy pathways; (ii) fostering the con-
stant improvement of achievable safety standards; and (iii) encouraging the
uniformity of standards.
Given these aims, the legitimacy of such regulations should not focus
on the centralized and formal character of rule-making, but on some pro-
cedural advantages, considering both its ability to be open and warrant the
joint participation of companies, government and stakeholders in a rule-
making program and its suitability for a basis of proper private account-
ability pathways.
Resorting to excessive or solely "command-and-control" regulation
may slow down the development of knowledge, give rise to inefficient
regulation, and encourage "lex shopping" by the business community or
by consumers. On the contrary, a mix of hard law and soft law, including
self-regulation measures, would seem to be a sound alternative".
25. MARCHANT, SYLVESTER and ABBOTT (2008), op. cit. The potential of soft law measures
in approaching nanotechnologies has been widely pointed out by the Foresight Guidelines for
Responsible Nanotechnology Development (Foresight Institute, 2006).
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"Soft law" usually refers to legal tools working on the basis of volun-
tary compliance and not supported by legally institutionalized sanctions.
In this sense, "soft law" includes (i) declarations and opinions worked out
by governmental and non-governmental organizations or by national, su-
pranational, and international institutions; (ii) technical regulation based
on standards or self-regulation, such as codes of conduct or audit systems
(voluntary self-regulation) and (iii) private regulations enforced by the
government (enforced self-regulation)^^
In order to examine the idea of a regulatory framework characterized in
this fashion, any formalistic view of law should be abandoned in favor of
a legal view that acknowledges the social sources of legal phenomenon",
A conscious mix of hard and soft law would have the flexibility as well
as the dynamic character required to manage the potential side efFects of
emerging technologies^^ A regulatory framework should not limit itself
to prohibiting or commanding, but should foster knowledge processes.
It should construe arenas for "bidirectional learning", through which not
only the knowledge of consequences and the gradual transformation of un-
certainty into risk becomes increasingly possible, but also the suitability of
the regulatory measure in question can be evaluated through constant com-
munication between the normative framework, scientific knowledge and
the social context. Appealing to self-regulation could facilitate the sharing
of responsibilities, taking advantage of information flows, and giving a
voice to experts: thus, regulations would gain efficiency^'.
In contrast, critiques of soft law underline its lack of certainty and its
tendency to erode rationality in legal norms^°. In particular, self-regulation
could contribute to legal fragmentation by multiplying legal regimes^', fos-
26. AYRES, I. and BRAITHWAITE J. (1992), Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregu-
lation Debate, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 103 ff.
27. WiTTEVEEN, W.J. (2005), "A Self-regulation Paradox: Notes Towards the Social Logic of
Regulation", Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 9, n. 1, http://www.ejcl.org.
28. ABBOTT, K . W . et al. (2006), A Framework Convention for Nanotechnology?, 'Environ-
mental Law Reporter', 36, pp. 10931-10942.
29. OST, F. {200S), Dalla Pirámide alla rete: un nuovo pradigmaper la scienza giuridica?, in
M. VOGLIOTTI (a cura di), // tramonto delta modemità giuridica. Un percorso interdisciplinare,
Giappichelli, Torino, pp. 29-48, p. 44.
30. KxABBERS, J. (1998), "The Undesiderability of Soft Law", Nordic Journal of Interna-
tional Law, 67, pp. 381-391.
31. KLABBERS, J. (1996), "The Redundancy of Soft Law", Nordic Journal of International
Law, 65, pp. 167-182.
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tering technocratic trends, and moving away from the democratic repre-
sentation perspective.
When denning a regulatory model, three basic elements should be tak-
en into consideration: (i) the principles embodied by the model; (ii) the
technical standards implied by the model; and (iii) the mechanisms of en-
forcement and the reasonable degree of compliance which can be available
or constructed". The view of law and regulation that is widespread within
civil law culture tends to give little relevance to enforcement, and more
generally, to the link between norms and social context. In contrast, some
theories of regulation, for example, the theory of "responsive regulation"",
are meant to acknowledge the role of social context and enforcement in
shaping regulatory models.
The element of uncertainty and its qualitative distinctiveness from risk
may, in my view, justify soft law as a useftil subsidiary tool. While some
believe it could be a way of diminishing responsibility, soft regulation actu-
ally seems to foster the distribution of responsibility and to promote stake-
holders' participation. The active involvement of businesses and epistemic
communities in regulations could increase information as well as normative
compliance. For example, businesses are "strategic" addressees of regula-
tion, since they are able to strengthen communication toward other subjects
(employees, suppliers, partners, consumers, local or expert communities,
and the environment). This approach is coherent with the acknowledgment
of the role that private actors play in determining both normative effective-
ness and normative efficacy, and underscores the importance of accountabil-
ity, which concerns both private subjects and public authorities.
If and how much self-regulatory tools may succeed in this aim natural-
ly depends on the success of constructing communication and monitoring
mechanisms for the activities of enterprise (quality and purposes of R&D,
features of the life-cycle of products, respect for the environment, respect
for consumers and employees' rights, and promotion of social needs). It
also depends on the choice of the proper form of delegation from govern-
mental power to private entity.
In this sense, it is intriguing to see if regulatory models at some point
could overcome the dichotomy between private and public by expressing
32. On the role of the enforcement to determine the quality of regulation: BALDWIN, R. and
CAVE, M . (1999), Understanding Regulation. Theory, Strategy, and Practice, Oxford University
Press, New York, p. 117.
33. AYRES and BRAITHWAITE (1992), op. cit.; BALDWIN and CAVE (1999), op. cit.
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the distinction between state and society in terms of "policontextural-
ity", i.e., the idea that several social perspectives are reflected in the law,
without a distinction among them always being possible^"*. This could
be a way of overcoming the view that allowing room for self-regulation
encourages the eclipse of public authority by private interests". Such a
phenomenon has been often explained in a superficial way: according
to popular opinion, the spread of private law categories is explained by
their proximity to economic interests. This explanation overlooks what
seems to be another important reason: the specific proximity of private
law categories to social contexts which is becoming a leading factor for
determining the success of regulatory models, to the extent that state
sovereignty is becoming weaker. The key element for understanding and
framing regulatory inputs in light of transnational issues that have arisen
as a result of technological development lies in the centrality of the nexus
between law and society. This idea has been neglected and even rejected
by the formalistic view of law prevailing in the modem age, but must be
retrieved to face the challenges posed by globalization and the diffusion
of technology.
Soft law, specifically in the sense of self-regulation, may have a sig-
nificant degree of compliance, since the juris-genesis here tends to rest
on the validity associated with the norms. Norms originate because the
subjects contributing to their formation and diffusion acknowledge their
validity and agree on their purposes. In contrast, in the case of command-
and-control regulation, sanction is the key to effectiveness, and a deficit of
control of compliance tends to become a structural deficit of enforcement.
This is why soft law may be even more effective than legally and formally
binding norms'*.
34. TEUBNER, G . ( 1999), Diritto policontesturale: prospettive giuridiche della pluralizzazione
dei mondi sociali, trad. it. La Città del Sole, Napoli, p. 146.
35. FERRARESE, M.R. (2000), Le istituzioni dellaglobalizzazione. Diritto e diritti nellasocietà
transnazionale, il Mulino, Bologna, especially ch. Ill; FERRARESE, M.R. (2006), Diritto sconfl-
nato. Inventiva giuridica e spazi nel mondo globale, Laterza, Roma-Bari; GAt,GANO, F. (2005),
La globalizzazione nello specchio del diritto, il Mulino, Bologna, ch. IV; Rossi, G. (2003), //
conßitto epidémico, Adelphi, Milano.
36. PARKER, C. (2002), The Open Corporation. Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; AYRES and BRAITHWAITE (1992), op. cit., especially pp.
103-116, where it argues for a regulatory model based on public enforcement of privately pro-
mulgated standards, understood as a form of delegation or subcontracting of regulatory functions
from the government to the regulated private subjects.
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Of course, specific legitimization issues arise in soft law. One of the
most frequently used arguments against self-regulation emphasizes its
democratic deficit. According to this argument, law stemming from civil
society without legislative formalization (or delegation) would seem to
lack any democratic legitimization. This could be addressed by stressing
that self-regulation must adapt to the legal order (its principles and sourc-
es) and can regulate matters in-depth by following a "bottom-up" perspec-
tive, seeking for precision but also flexibility, and taking advantage of the
role private actors could play in promoting a good quality of regulation and
compliance. In a globalized world, self-regulation measures could even
claim a democratic character, to the extent that normative measures are
based on information sharing and stakeholders' participation.
Provided, therefore, that the efficacy of the precautionary principle de-
pends on the method of its implementation, soft law measures that may un-
derpin forms of diffuse participation and responsibility, as well as account-
ability toward risk assessment, communication, and management could
be a sound solution. This is the solution that seems to be suggested by
the "Code of Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences and Nanotechnolo-
gies Research" adopted by the European Commission in 2008 (Resolution
2008/345/CE).
Considering the insufficiency of most traditional risk management
models in confronting the uncertainty that characterizes the consequences
of emerging technologies for the environment and human health, such an
issue does not concern going beyond the precautionary principle adher-
ing to it", but rather to search for the soundest meaning of this principle
through coherent and effective regulatory measures.
37. SuNSTEiN, CR. (2005), Laws of Fear. Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge (Mass.).
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Resumen: El trabajo trata sobre el impac-
to de las nanotecnologias en la regulación
legal y parte de la idea de que las tecno-
logías emergentes ofrecen una excelente
perspectiva desde la cual analizar el paso
del gobierno a la gobemanza que es típico
de nuestros días.
Las nanotecnologias afectan a varios as-
pectos legales, entre ellos la protección
medioambiental, la protección de los con-
sumidores, el derecho médico, la salud y se-
guridad laborales, y las libertades civiles,
los derechos de propiedad intelectual y el
derecho de patentes.
El trabajo desarrolla tres puntos fundamen-
tales: 1. la aplicabilidad de los productos
nanotecnológicos y de los procesos jurídi-
cos actualmente vigentes a otros supuestos;
2. el significado, papel y límites del princi-
pio de precaución; 3. el papel del soft law
en la gobemanza de las nanotecnologias.
El trabajo parte de un significado construc-
tivo del principio de precaución y de que
ese significado sólo se puede clarificar a
través de la implementación del principio;
la autoregulación y el soft law se ven como
una forma adecuada de regulación si están
unidos a un hard law, para implementar el
principio de precaución y para reducir la
incertidumbre que provocan las nuevas tec-
nologías.
Palabras clave: Ncinotecnologías; nanome-
dicina; derecho y tecnología; principio de
precaución; regulación reactiva; soft law;
gobemanza de las nanotecnologias.
Abstract: The paper deals with the impact
of nanotechnologies on the view of legal
regulation and moves from the idea that
emerging technologies offer an excellent
perspective from which to analyze the shift
from government to governance, that typi-
cally occurs nowadays.
Nanotechnologies affect many legal do-
mains, including environmental protection,
consumer protection, medical law, occupa-
tional health and safety, privacy and civil
liberties, intellectual property rights, and
patent law.
Three main issues are addressed in the pa-
per; (1) the applicability to nanotechno-
logies products and processes of the law
already in force for other purposes; (2) the
meaning, role and limits of the precautio-
nary principle; (3) the role of soft law in the
governance of nanotechnologies.
In the paper, a constructive meaning of the
precautionary principle is embraced; it is
maintained that such meaning can only be
clarified through the implementation of the
principle; self-regulation and soft law are
thought of as a form of regulation suitable,
if properly joined with hard law, to imple-
ment the precautionary principle and to ma-
nage the uncertainty arising from emerging
technologies.
Key words: Nanotechnologies; nanome-
dicine; law and technology; precautionary
principle; responsive regulation; soft law;
governance of nanotechnologies.
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